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Les banques françaises à Hong-Kong (1860-1950s) : des challengers pour les 
banques britanniques ? 
Résumé 
L’expansion bancaire française en Asie du Sud-Est et chinoise s’est insérée dans 
les interstices laissés libres par les puissantes banques britanniques. Mais les 
intérêts bancaires et marchands français ont pris pied sur la place de Hong Kong 
parce qu’elle était insérée dans un réseau d’échanges avec l’Indochine qui 
connaissait une forte croissance au fur et à mesure de sa colonisation et de sa 
« mise en valeur ». Le développement des liens commerciaux entre la colonie et 
Hong Kong explique le renforcement des échanges de devises et de crédits entre 
les deux territoires, par le biais de la Banque de l’Indochine, représentante en 
Asie des intérêts bancaires français pour contenir la concurrence de Hsbc. Elle 
finance les flux commerciaux entre l’Asie et la France (soie, etc.), directement 
(par Lyon, Bordeaux et Paris) ou indirectement par sa succursale de Londres. 
Mais la succursale de Hong Kong devient aussi de plus en plus une tête de pont 
facilitant le développement d’affaires bancaires dans toute la Chine méridionale 
(Canton, etc.), ce qui fait d’elle un levier essentiel du dispositif bancaire français 
en Asie, aux côtés de la succursale de Shanghai. 
 
Mots-clés : Impérialisme, première mondialisation, banque, outre-mer, négoce, 
lettres de change, Chine, Hong Kong, Canton 
 
 
French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
Abstract 
French banking expansion in China and South-East Asia had to respect the 
powerful influence of British banks there. From the 1860s French merchant and 
banking interests had been involved in Hong Kong business because of the 
colonial developments in Indochina and the links between this area and the Hong 
Kong centre. The growth of commercial links between the colony and China 
favoured further integration of banking and currency exchanges with Hong Kong, 
through the Banque de l’Indochine corporation, competing with Hsbc. It was 
itself committed to finance Asian-French commercial flows (silk, etc.) directly 
(Lyon, Bordeaux, Paris) or indirectly (London branch) took part to banking links 
with France. But Hong Kong also became a bridgehead for Banque de 
l’Indochine into southern China (Canton, etc.) from the1890s up to the 1930s 
and, in parallel with the Shanghai branch, its branch there asserted itself as a 
part of French expansion in the Far-East. 
 
Key words:  Imperialism, First Globalization, Bank, Overseas, China, Hong-Kong, 
Guangzhou 
 
JEL : G20, N25 
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French banks could not imagine to shake the domination of the British banks on the 
Hong Kong market and their capital of influence throughout China
1, all the more because 
French companies were far less active in Hong Kong
2 and China than the British ones. The 
very presence of French banks there is surprising if we consider the role played by the 
Shanghai market
3 for their leader Banque de l’Indochine and the trade flows fostered by the 
Yang Ze Kiang shipping for French wholesale traders (for instance up to Wuhan)
4, and if we 
take into account the priority given by French interests to the penetration into China through 
the railway linking French Tonkin to south-western China. This akward presence in Hong 
Kong raises thus questions about the missions attributed to French bankers there: were they 
helping French trading networks within South-East Asia
5 for clearing activities? Were they 
involved in financing trading in southern China? Were they taking part to the life of the Hong 
Kong banking market itself? Let us precise that for decades French banks were represented in 
Hong Kong by a single bank, acting as they ambassador, first the Comptoir d’escompte de 
Paris (CEP), then Banque de l’Indochine, because they were conscious of the comparative 
edge of British banks and especially of the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank (HSBC), and they 
agreed to avoid competition among them – up to the 1960s-1990s. Germany followed a while 
the same path (whith Deutsch-Asiatisch Bank, linked with Deutsche Bank) and Belgium also 
– with Banque sino-belge in 1902, then in 1913 Banque Belge pour l’Étranger, an affiliate of 
Société générale de Belgique, which gave birth in 1934 to Banque Belge pour l’Étranger 
(Extrême-Orient)
6. 
By chance we got access to the correspondance between the Hong Kong branch of 
Banque de l’Indochine and its Paris headquarters, which helped us develop the pioneering 
analysis of Marc Meuleau’s history of the Banque de l’Indochine (BIC)
7. Our text will first 
determine how a French banking institution took foot in Hong Kong; it will second precise 
the part played by the BIC Hong Kong branch within the commercial system of French 
Indochina; third, it will scrutinize the networks woven by the branch all over west-southern 
China; fourth, it will ponder the endeavours to assert itself on the Hong Kong local banking 
market; last, it will reconstitute the growth and the evolution of the branch in the midst of 
short-term economic trends, or of the political and military environment. Throughout this 
survey, we’ll follow there the path of business history applied to banking history, 
                                                 
1 Cf. J. Osterhammel, “Imperialism in transition: British Business in China, 1860s-1950s”, in R.T.P. Davenport 
& Geoffrey Jones (eds.), British Business in Asia since 1860, Cambridge, Cambridge University Peess, 1989, pp. 
189-227. 
2 Norman Miners, Hong Kong under Imperial Rule, 1912-1941, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1987. 
Geoffrey Sayers, Hong Kong (1862-1919): Years of Discretion, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1968. 
Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, London, Tauris, 2004. 
3 See H. Bonin, « Les banquiers français à Shanghai dans les années 1860-1940 », in Le Paris de l’Orient. 
Présence française à Shanghai, 1849-1946, Albert Kahn Museum, Boulogne/Seine, 2002, pp. 113-119. 
4 See E.W.Edwards, « British policy in China, 1913-1914. Rivalry with France in the Yangtze Valley », Journal 
of Oriental Studies, 40, 1977, pp. 20-36. 
5 See H. Bonin, « The French banks in the Pacific area (1860-1945) », in Olive Checkland, Shizuya Nishimura & 
Norio Tamaki (eds.), Pacific Banking (1859-1959). East Meets West, Londres, MacMillan and New York,   
St. Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 61-74. H. Bonin, « L’activité des banques françaises dans l’Asie du Pacifique des 
années 1860 aux années 1940 », Revue française d’histoire d'outre-mer, 1994, tome 81, n°305, pp. 401-425.  
6 See René Brion & Jean-Louis Moreau, La Société générale de Belgique, 1822-1997, Anvers, Fonds Mercator, 
1997. 
7 Marc Meuleau, Des pionniers en Extrême-Orient. La Banque de l’Indochine, 1875-1975, Paris, Fayard, 1990. 
To be complemented by: Yasuo Gonjo, Banque coloniale ou banque d’affaires ? La Banque de l’Indochine sous 
la III
e République, Paris, Comité pour l’histoire économique & financière de la France, 1993 (first published in 
Japanese, Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1985) French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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encompassing the evolution of the portofolio of strategical activities of the branch, its 
portfolio of skills, and its performance. 
1. The emergence of a French bank in Hong Kong 
Conversely with the negative perception of French banks’ history and “black legend” 
about they supposed “backwardness”, they had been early and firmly committed to 
international developments
8, alongside the balance of power which prevailed on several levels 
and areas in favour of British institutions and somewhere of German or Belgian affiliates. CEP 
conceived for instance a strategy to prop up its customership of middle-sized companies – 
especially in trading on several commercial and maritime cities – by offering them a network 
of relays all over the scope covered by French traders in the Mediterranean area and then 
beyond Suez, particularly after the Suez canal
9 was opened –, alongside some “imperial 
design”
10, in Australia, India, China, and Hong Kong. 
A. A bridgehead in Hong Kong to contain British domination and 
promote French business 
There in Hong Kong, CEP branch functioned from 1862 to 1877 – the closure forcing 
the BIC Saigon branch to work with Oriental Bank in Hong Kong –, and was reopened in 
1884 – perhaps because Oriental Bank collapsed in May 1884 in the midst of a sharp 
recession in 1883-1884, which opened a window of opportunity for the French institution in 
favour of French interests in Asia, especially the Cochinchina ones, all the more because 
France tried then to extend its grip on Tonkin and needed a relay in Hong Kong to promote 
French trade houses. On a middle term, CEP felt more and more the effects of the depreciation 
of silver against gold because part of its Asian assets had been based on silver values and 
moreover because the risks on cash and bills transfer and exchange operations from Asia to 
Paris and London had become too high, and CEP chose to alleviate its commitment to further 
Chinese developments; on a short term, it could have suffered from the Chinese boycott 
against French products because of the war in Tonkin. IN the meanwhile, the creation of BIC 
and the collapse of CEP in 1889 (replaced by Comptoir national d’escompte de Paris or CNEP) 
paved the way to a new scheme; whilst CNEP kept its Australian, Indian, and Egyptian 
strongholds
11, BIC, now the key banking institution in the whole Indochina, also assumed – as 
a counterpart – the mission to represent French banks in China (Shanghai in 1898, Guangzhou 
and Hankeou in 1902, Beijing and Tien Tsin in 1907) and South-East Asia (Bangkok in 1897, 
Singapore in 1905).  
This led to its landing in Hong Kong, where it inherited from the CNEP agency in 1894 
and opened its own branch – the first report being sent to Paris on 28 August 1894. In fact the 
Paris board was hostile to such forays in China, but the State had linked the renewal of its 
                                                 
8 H. Bonin, « The international factors in the development of the French banking system », in Rondo Cameron & 
Victor Bovykin, International banking & industrial finance, 1870-1914, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992. 
9 H. Bonin, Suez, du canal à la finance (1857-1987), Paris, Économica, 1987. 
10 H. Bonin, « Le Comptoir national d’escompte de Paris, une banque impériale (1848-1940) », Revue française 
d'histoire d'outre-mer, tome 78, n°293, 1991, pp. 477-497. Yasuo Gonjo, “The Comptoir d’escompte de Paris in 
the Far East in the second half of the 19th century”, Kinyu Keizai, n°175, April 1979, pp. 477-497; n°176, June 
1979, pp. 97-129 (both articles in Japanese). 
11 M. Meuleau, op.cit., p. 153. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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concession for issuing banknotes in Indochina with a forward policy in Asia
12 to sustain the 
French trading houses and shipping, thus containing somehow British and German ones. A 
new policy has been shaped under minister of Foreign Affairs Gabriel Hanotaux (May 1894-
November 1895; April 1896-June 1898) consisting with taking profit from China’s military 
and diplomatic crisis (the China-Japan war of 1894-1895) and part of China’s commercial 
dismantlement: France was given leeway to develop its influence in Yunnan, to prospect 
mines in south-western China, an area where first advantages had been reaped through the 
1887 treaty
13. The mission of Banque de l’Indochine (BIC) was reinforced by the fact the 
Société générale (in 1887) and Crédit lyonnais (in 1895) renounced to their project to settle in 
Asia and agreed to consider it as the sole representative of French banking community in this 
area. The State demanded to BIC to supplement this diplomatic and commercial offensive 
through a willful banking policy, to which the bank was still reluctant, only yearning for 
exploiting its Indochinese bastion: “We do not consider to tackle in Hong Kong operations of 
discount or advances, for which we would perhaps not be as well positioned as local banks. 
Our sole objective, through opening this branch, is to assume and ease to our branches in 
Cochinchina and Tonkin a regular development of their operations.”
14 
This explains the precarious situation of the Hong Kong branch, which was first 
dependant from the Saigon one (between 1894 and 1898) and had to prove its very usefulness 
to the Paris direction. Despite its small dimension, it had to define a portfolio of strategic 
activities which should allow it first to be profitable, second to find out some niches between 
the leading positions of British banks (HSBC, Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London 
and China, etc.): every year it had to conquer its raison d’être. The branch was often 
inspected either by the manager of the larger Saigon branch, or by an inspector from Paris, to 
check the reliability of the books, which was required because of the isolation there among an 
ocean of large British corporations. BIC Hong Kong was the key French branch on the Hong 
Kong market, even if a few competitors tried to get access in direct to some business here: 
Banque russo-chinoise was first a partner, then it broke its relationship with BIC
15 and opened 
its own branch in Hong Kong in 1904, which never played a significant role; a harsh 
competitor to BIC, Banque industrielle de Chine (BIDC), tried to establish a bridgehead in 
Hong Kong; but it failed in 1923 and rescued under the name Banque franco-chinoise, did not 
either become decisive in Hong Kong, and it ceded its assets to BIC
16 in 1937.. 
B. The lean organisation of a second-rank player 
To pretend to success, the branch was slightly equipped; this was due to the fact that the 
CNEP branch was managed from the Shanghai one and required only two European sub-
managers; the premises – a second storey on the mountain road – were simple, even if located 
in front of the HSBC building
17. A very small team of European expatriates constitued the core 
of its little organisation: three sub-managers (cashier, accountant) with three auxiliaries in 
                                                 
12 See Nora Wang, L’Asie orientale du milieu du XIX
e siècle à nos jours, Paris, Armand Colin, 1993. 
13 See R. Lee, France and the exploitation of China, 1885-1901, Hong Kong & London, 1989. 
14 Annual report of the Banque de l’Indochine board, 16 May 1894, quoted by M. Meuleau, op. cit., p. 154. 
15 M. Meuleau, op. cit., p. 199. 
16 Letter from the branch manager to Paris headquarters, 5 August 1937. Banque de l’Indochine lent FRF 44 
million to help BIDC repay its deposits, with a four-year term. Correspondance between the Hong Kong branch 
and the Paris headquarters of Banque de l’Indochine (archives of Banque de l’Indochine, Crédit agricole SA, or 
CASA, Archives). We do thank Roger Nougaret, the head of CASA Archives, for opening such documents, and its 
staff for its collaboration. 
17 Ibidem, 6 March 1895 French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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1895 (as “commissionned agent”), and the “chief manager”. Local employees were also 
active, for instance (up to 1929) two Portuguese brothers, Xavier, one in charge of the count 
Advances on equity (from 1902) and the other one of the count Exchange contracts and of day 
to day interbank clearing.  
But the growth of the activities of the branch and the conscience of its real future led the 
Paris direction to favour twice a removal. It was first transferred in the premises of the 
Imperial Bank of China (which closed its branch in August 1905) in a building (Prince 
Building) already occupied by Yokohama Specie Bank and Banque russo-chinoise – but on 
the opposite side – and started its operations there on 18 December 1905. The extension of 
operations justified a second removal to a new six-storeys building
18, built from July 1924 
just near Chartered Bank, Mercantile Bank, and Bank of Guangzhou: it was delivered on 8 
April 1926 and inaugurated on 19 April. Its groundfloor welcomed the branch, the first storey 
Crédit foncier d’Extrême-Orient, and the other ones were rented except one used to house 
three employees. BIC disposed twice of a relevant space and more importantly of a material 
leverage to assert its standing on the Hong Kong market in face of British institutions
19. 
The fate of the branch rested in fact on the very qualities of its managing director; life 
conditions were anyway hard and some expatriates could not resist the climate environment: 
Léon Simon had to left after only a few months in Hong Kong where he got tuberculosis... 
Happily, his colleagues were stable, and could thus consolidate their capital of competence: 
Meyer (1894-1895); L. Berindoague (1896-1919), and Martot (1920-1940). The director 
supervised a work-force which was kept under a drastic ceiling because of the requirements of 
profitability: it managed commonly the day to day back-office processes about the registration 
of bills of exchange flows, of exchange operations, and of accountancy books. Its quality was 
generally recognised by the director and the inspectors; and the skills of the cashier were so 
much admitted that he was elevated to the charge of director of the sister branch on 
Guangzhou in March 1910 – being replaced by an executive coming from Bangkok. The key 
difficulty for European employees was the price of lodging (particularly for families), which 
explains long-distance commuting (from Kowloon), and a house was built to welcome part of 
them
20 in 1924-1925, whilst a few ones were lodged in the new building of the branch from 
1924. Although uneven
21, the quality of expatriates was recognised by the executives, and a 
member of the staff (André Ruyters) was admitted as so good that he was promoted as 
director of the Hankeou branch in 1924. 
C. The compradores at Banque de l’Indochine Hong Kong: 
continuity and reliability 
As usual in Chinese business
22, a comprador inserted the branch within the local 
business community. Kwok Sui Lau was recruited in 1894 under a pledge which was 
constituted of mortgages on his property, the deposit of equity (750 shares of the Hong Kong 
                                                 
18 Ibidem, 22 July 1924. 
19 See Iain Black, “Reordering space: British bank building overseas, 1900-1940”, in Ton de Graaf, Joost Jonker 
& Jaap-Jan Mobron, European Banking Overseas, 19th-20th Century, Amsterdam, EABH & ABN-AMRO, 2002, 
pp. 77-108. 
20 Letter from the branch manager, 13 June 1924. 
21 Because of disordered practices, or even a small fraud by the accountant in 1925. 
22 See Hao Yen-Ping, The Comprador in the 19th Century China: Bridge betwwen East and West, Cambridge 
(Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1970. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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Guangzhou Macao Steamboat), and a financial guarantee ($70,000)
23 by two other Chinese 
people – among which banker Loy Hing –, the total amount reaching $113,750; he kept his 
job up to 1906: “Since eleven years that I work with him, I did consider him very much; he is 
a serious man, very rightful, sincerely devoted to our institution.”
24 “During the difficult crisis 
on 1905, he showed an exceptional vigilance; thanks to his intelligent zeal, our bank was the 
sole in Hong Kong to get unscathed out of the numerous failures whicc occurred then.”
25  
He was replaced by Ho Wing Tsun
26, who had worked for HBSC as an employee 
(shroff), then became a businessman, and started on the job from November 1906. He 
managed his own team, comprising about twenty employees in 1910 (3 shroffs, 2 cashier-
shroffs, 4 counter-shroffs, 9 office coolies, 2 office boys and one cook
27....) and 30 in 1922 
(14 shroffs, 8 coolies, 2 bank coolies, 3 office boys, 1 detective, 2 cooks
28). “Our compradore 
is a serious but timorous man, who is, guided by our ancient comprador, a much honest man, 
ever devoted to our institution.”
29 The branch was lucky relying on qualified and serious 
compradores, and it did not suffer any disappointment
30 up to 1927. Ho crossed WW1 and was 
still active in the 1920s, with a fortune of $500 to 600,000 and a pledge of $150,000 provided 
by Kwok, the first compradore. At this time, his earnings came out of 1/8 percent commission 
on business he initiated and of a ¾ per cent on profits. Ho was so much reliable that his son 
Ho Huyen
31, who had been his deputy for five years, became the compradore of a new branch 
which BIC opened in Kouang Tcheou Wan (or Fort-Bayart) in 1924. Ho Win Tsun died in 
August 1929 and was replaced by Kwok Chan, the son of Kwok Siu Lau, the ancient 
compradore, who had worked as a deputy compradore at the branch for  five years – whilst 
his brother Kowk On climbed up to the charge of head of the equity department in July 1929. 
Kwok junior presented a pledge of $825,700. 
2. A relay for the Asian network of Banque de l’Indochine 
The initial function of the Hong Kong branch of BIC (thereafter: ‘BIC Hong Kong’) was 
to be a mere tool at the service of the main branches of Indochina, and then also of the 
branches opened in China and even in Singapour. It was not equipped to manage assets by 
itself as it had been attributed only with £25,000 as a capital to finance its day to day needs, 
through a draft by the headquarters. But its scope was extended year after year thanks to 
banking opportunities and to the portfolio of skills steadly constituted by keen directors, 
which perceived the niches opened to flexible and profitable operations; their major concern 
was to avoid taking risks larger than their financial means, which led them to lean on the main 
                                                 
23 We use $ for Honk Kong dollars, and USD for US dollars. 
24 Letter from the branch manager, 6 February 1906. 
25 Ibidem, 21 August 1906. 
26 Loo Lim Yeuk was presumed to be his financing support; he belonged to a rich family with an estimated 
fortune of $1,500,000, and intended to provide, with his brothers, a $150,000 surety (through pledged property) 
[Ibidem, 5 May 1906]; but it appeared that he was the tycoon of game and lottery in Macao and Canton, which 
was no relevant for a bank... After some difficulties, because of the harsh recession of these times, he was 
replaced by Li Shek Pan, rich with a fortune of $600,000, who already guaranteed the compradore of the 
Bangkok branch, and brought a surety of $100,000 to Ho [21 August 1906].   
27 Ibidem, 5 March 1910. 
28 Ibidem, 17 August 1922. 
29 Ibidem, 7 March 1914. 
30 Conversely with the HSBC branch, where the compradore flew in September 1912 abnd left a decifit between 
$500,000 to one million (Ibidem, 4 October 1912). 
31 Ibidem, 25 November 1924. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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banks to use their capital of experience. This progress was stimulated when in 1900 BIC 
recognised the durable efficiency and success of its Hong Kong branch: it allocated extended 
resources, for an amount of one million francs (£40,000)
32, which reached
33 about £334,676 
(or $3,245,338) in 1929. 
One key role took shape rapidly: the director became a relevant source of information 
for BIC about the evolution of financial, political, and even military events all over southern 
China – often crossing History because of political and military effects of the evolution of the 
regime in Beijing on the southern states and warlords, from the struggles in the 1890s up to 
the successive revolutions in the 1910s-1920s. For example, it collected rich details about the 
mining projects at the beginning of the 20th century and about the main actors of these 
developments in Yunnan, because of its links with Guangzhou and Hong Kong merchants, 
who were involved and could provide opportunities of financing their trade
34. 
A. The function of clearing bills of exchange and managing 
exchange 
One important task was the remittance of bills of exchange and documentary credits 
from Hong Kong to London: the branch paid cash Hong Kong customers and send the files to 
the branch of BIC in the City – with a ceiling fixed at $25,000 for the global amount of 
overdraft
35 (then 45,000 from 1901). Alongside the variations of interest rates, it purchased 
bills in Hong Kong, either for its own account or for the account of other Asian BIC branches, 
sending part of their cash assets to their sister branch (especially the Saigon branch), and 
transmitted them mainly to London or also to Paris; an amount of $751,000 was thus due by 
the London branch in 1912 for exchange contracts
36. 
The main skills of the Hong Kong branch became its ability of joining the foreign 
exchange market – in fact often linked with the trading of bills of exchange. Even if BIC 
Guangzhou branch put brakes on the mutualisation of such forex activity on Hong Kong and 
even gained its autonomy in February 1910 for this activity, the Hong Kong market 
predominated in the area, because it was fostered by the treasury moves between the 
numerous and often powerful banks there. French silk merchants in Guangzhou sent for 
example bills to the Hong Kong branch for the name of Saigon merchants, thus opening 
operations of exchange from pounds to francs; they acted through brokers, negotiating 
exchange contracts with the Hong Kong banks to get the best rate, and the BIC branch was 
more and more competitive from the turn of the 20th century, all the more that its growing 
availabilities allowed it to extend somewhat its risks. 
For this whole range of operations, the Hong Kong branch worked intimately with the 
Guangzhou branch because, during the slack season (in the winter), it endured a glut of cash. 
Even if HSBC reinforced its presence in Guangdong, BIC Hong Kong remained competitive, 
and welcomed Guangzhou piasters to be exchanged in Hong Kong against dollars or pounds, 
or mainly documentary credits remitted to London
37. But the Saigon and Haiphong branches 
                                                 
32 Ibidem, 3 February and 28 April 1900. 
33 Ibidem, 18 January 1929. 
34 Ibidem, 7 March 1905. 
35 Ibidem, 14 February 1895. 
36 Ibidem, 6 March 1912. 
37 Ibidem, 24 November 1908 (at 5% for four months). French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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also purchased bills issued on Hong Kong and sent them to the Hong Kong branch – resisting 
the competition from brokers proposing better rates
38. 
After WW1, incertitudes about the franc and erratic moves on currencies fueled concerns 
and led BIC Hong Kong to develop operations in Hong Kong dollars, USD, and pounds. Local 
exchanges could suffered from the variations of Chinese currencies issued in the southern 
provinces (especially Yunnan throughout the 1920s), where merchants linked to the branch 
were so active: this explains the growth of exchange operations – even if the BIC Shanghai 
branch prevailed far much – thanks to the link between the Hong Kong dollar and the pound 
and thus to gold
39. Risks intensified and the manager had to follow prudent paths and to 
collect keen information to tackle his portfolio on currencies – all the more because military 
and political events in continental China (in the near Guangdong, for instance) provoked 
uncertainty: “Reports on sterling constitute for the moment the most favourable investment for 
our local disponibilities.”
40 Because of the general crisis perhaps, of the harsh crisis of 
Indochinese economy
41, of the uncertainty about the Shanghai market, or surely of the 
floating currency rates from 1931-1933, exchange operations became the core activity of BIC 
Hong Kong in the mid-1930s, with reports on Hong Kong dollars, through a local 
interbanking market (“cross operations”) as a way to invest availabilities. In 1935, operations 
were intensified: silver was purchased in London and resold on Hong Kong against Hong 
Kong dollars because the Hong Kong dollar was quoted under its silver value
42: the whole 
banking market was then speculating on forex (for about $40,000 and FRF 10 million in 1935): 
“The Hong Kong branch draws almost all its profits from arbitrage operations. During a few 
years, when the forex remains still, it cannot relieve on important profits because exchanges 
with Indochina and local advances on equity, which constituted a few years ago substantial 
benefits, are for the moment almost wholly stopped.”
43 A very last operation relied on fine 
gold trading when BIC purchased gold (for $ 2 million) to Swiss Bank and Hambros in Europe 
and resold it partly (£412,000) to National City Bank, Swiss Bank, and Hambros
44, perhaps 
because of intense opportunities to play on the variations of local Chinese and Hong Kong 
currencies. 
B. The function of investing treasury disponibilities 
The core function of the Hong Kong branch was to put at work the cash availabilities of 
the network of BIC all over Asia, when they could not invest it into trading business. The 
Saigon branch was due to be the first beneficiary of such a short term policy for its cash 
assets, and its deposits were supposed to feed the Hong Kong branch with working capital, far 
beyond the permanent but thin line of credit opened in Paris. But freedom prevailed because 
the Saigon manager pleaded for its independancy and, for example, he concluded business 
agreements with HSBC in the 1895 for cash valuation through trading on Mexican piasters (for 
                                                 
38 Ibidem, 30 March 1909; the discount rate in Saigon then was 8,75%. 
39 See. M. Meuleau, op.cit., p. 281. 
40 Letter from the branch manager, 25 May 1931. 
41 Pierre Brocheux, « The State and the 1930s depression in  French Indochina ». I. Nordlund, “Rice and the 
colonial lobby: the economic crisis in French Indochina in the 1920s and the 1930s”, in Weathering the Storm. 
The Economies of Southeast Asia in the 1930s Drepression, Singapour, ISEAS, 2000. 
42 Letter from the branch manager, 8 April 1935. 
43 Ibidem, 6 September 1935. 
44 Ibidem, 21 September 1938. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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about $8 million)
45; or he used its sister branch only for collateral loans on call, that is very 
short term operations, depriving the Hong Kong branch from middle-term resources. A 
similar attitude prevailed sometimes at the Guangzhou branch, the manager which was 
tempted to use a Guangzhou broker to find better interest rates for its treasury availabilities, 
short-circuiting the Hong Kong branch: “Acting that way, he is easing Hong Kong banks 
(Equitable Eastern Banking, Hong Kong Bank, Bank of East Asia) their exchange operations; 
he gave operations on francs to BEA which had much interested me because I am looking for 
cover in francs to my sales of dollars to Charbonnages du Tonkin.”
46  
Anyway, this desire of autonomy was often crushed by Paris decision and moreover by 
the ability of the Hong Kong branch to get better and better investments, thanks to its growing 
skills and creditworthiness on the market. In fact, a permanent exchange prevailed: the Hong 
Kong branch either provided Saigon with funds, or more often welcomed its treasury on 
deposit accounts, which fostered its own credit operations. Thus, in 1912, it lodged a $3 
million stable deposit
47, in fact its core resource – and the amount was of $746,000 in 1929 or 
about one fifth the $4 million permanent resources of the branch
48. It also purchased piasters 
in Hong Kong for the name of Saigon and Haiphong (up to $200,000 in 1895, for exemple). 
More importantly, traders with Saigon on the Hong Kong market benefitted from loans on 
collateral by the Hong Kong branch at the request of the Saigon one. Conversely it granted 
debt facilities to other BIC branches when necessary – for example $369,000 in favour of the 
Shanghai one, 300,000 for the Bangkok and 58,000 to Singapore
49 in 1912. 
C. At the service of the French banking community? 
Despite its independant strategy and management, BIC was inserted within the French 
banking community as it armed member against competitors in the Asian and Pacific area. 
This explains that its Hong Kong branch welcome funds from the CNEP branches overseas, or 
that it managed deals with the CNEP and the Banque russo-chinoise (active in north-eastern 
China
50) branches in San Francisco (in the 1890s) because of trans-Pacific business. It 
asserted itself rapidly as the correspondent in Hong Kong for Paris banks, and the daily mail 
from Paris arrived through the malle-poste owing French line Messageries maritimes or its 
competitors (for instance Deutscher Lloyd in the 1890s). This function was confirmed when 
in 1901 five French banks opened blank and permanent acceptance credit lines either in Paris 
or in London to the BIC Hong Kong branch
51. Locally it worked with the Guangzhou branch 
of  Banque russo-chinoise, only to oversee its sales of bills acquired in Guangzhou and 
payable in Hong Kong
52; and it reached an agreement in 1897 with its Shanghai branch, 
which opened a large deposit account there
53 – up to 1904. No direct source provides 
information of the activity of BIC Hong Kong in the name of other French banks, surely 
because these latter rely entirely on BIC to tackle Asian issues in favour of their own French 
                                                 
45 Ibidem, 20 February 1895. Trade on silver coins still was a core business in Asia; see Compton Mackensie, 
Realms of Silver. One Hundred Years of Banking in the East: The Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and 
China, London, Routledge & Paul Kegan, 1954. 
46 Letter from the branch manager, 17 May 1929. 
47 Ibidem, 6 March 1912. 
48 Ibidem, 18 January 1929. 
49 Ibidem, 6 March 1912. 
50 R. Quested, The Russo-Chinese Bank, Birmingham, Slavonic Monographs, n°2, Birmingham, 1977. 
51 Letter from the branch manager, 5 January 1901. 
52 Ibidem, 11 March 1897. 
53 Ibidem, 5 November 1897. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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clients. The single event occurred lately when the Groupe uni des banques françaises used 
BIC to open a common credit to the Central Bank in China in 1937 – apparently repaid by a 
monthly transfer from hg to London of 5,000 silver bars (or $25 million) by HSBC
54. 
The very first function of BIC Hong Kong was therefore completed with efficiency: it 
rised as a key hub for inner exchnges within the BIC network in South-East Asia (mainly 
Saigon and Guangzhou) and helped pushing large amount of cash capital to work through 
short-term investments on the Hong Kong banking market. Last, it played a key role and 
acquired an actual portfolio of skills for all the forex activities, as a little table of markets, 
which anyway could not have succeeded without the operations concluded daily with British 
big banks in Hong Kong. 
3. The Hong Kong branch at the service of French 
business’ interests 
BIC Hong Kong joined the fray of French interests in South-East Asia, alongside two 
main commercial axis.  
A. Banque de l’Indochine at the service of business between 
Indochina and Hong Kong 
It became a hub for favouring the relationship between Hong Kong and Indochina when 
this latter emerged as a somehow prosperous country able to export commodities
55. Its very 
first mission was the service to traders in Indochina, whom BIC, arguing that they were 
deprived of the capital of information and competence of the Hong Kong branch; convinced 
from the 1890s to use the branch instead of trying to manage their exceeding funds in Hong 
Kong through their own investments: “Up to now for their [of the Chinese traders in 
Haiphong] shipments of goods to Hong Kong and those which they received, exporters and 
importers agreed to clearing their operations, and the balance was sold to Hong Kong in 
cash. This caused them difficults, delays, and thus losss in interests. I showed them the 
advantages for them to use the BIC for these operations, and they understood very well.”
56 
Generally speaking, Hong Kong became a key hub for Indochinese exports, all the more 
because rice plants in Saigon-Cholon were in the hands of Chinese manufacturers and traders. 
                                                 
54 Ibidem, 19 November 1937. 
55 Patrice Morlat, Indochine années vingt: le balcon de la France sur le Pacifique. Une page de l’histoire, de 
France en Extrême-Orient, 1918-1928, Paris, Les Indes savantes, 2001. See also : Pierre Brocheux & Daniel 
Hémery,  Indochine, la colonisation ambiguë, 1858-1954, Paris, La Découverte, 1994, reedition 2001. I. 
Nordlund, “Rice production in colonial Vietnam, 1900-1930”, in Irène Nordlund (et alii, eds.), Rice Societies: 
Asian Problems and Prospects, London, Curzon Press, 1986. 
56 Letter from the Banque de l’Indochine Saigon director, 4 March 1889, in M. Meuleau, op.cit., p. 130. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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Table 1. Part of Hong Kong trade in the exterior trade of Cochinchina 
(yearly average 1879-1883)
57 
  In thousand piasters  Weight against the total 
From Cochinchina to Hong Kong  6,165  52,3% 
From Hong Kong to Cochinchina  3,489  39,2% 





1911-1913  25 to 30 % 
1919-1921 35% 
1923-1924 60% 
Indochinese traders exported huge amounts of rice to China, generally through Hong 
Kong, even some of the cargoes were delivered to coast port without transiting through Hong 
Kong. Saigon prevailed as the key port exporting rice to Hong Kong (541,000 tons in 1890); 
in parallel, Haiphong asserted itself as new source of trade: as soon as it was equipped with a 
modern port (from the 1890s) and rice cultivation still progressed in Tonkin, rice exports to 
Hong Kong grew a lot, (from 60,000 tons in 1892). Indochina remained the main supplyer of 
the Hong Kong market in the interwar: Chinese merchants purchased rice in Saigon, 
Bangkok, and Burmah, and sold it to Hong Kong traders, who selected, mixed, and stored 
them, before selling them to export houses (to China, Japan or else), thus opening 
opportunities to several stages of credit, to which BIC took a little part on Hong Kong – its 
main involvment being in Inchochina. 
Table 3. Flows of rice in April-October 1930 (in “piculs”)
59 
Imports to Hong Kong  5,570,000   
From Indochina   2,855,000  51,3% 
From Siam  2,216,000  39,8 
From Burmah   474,000  8,5 
Exports from Hong Kong  4,488,000   
North China  784,000   
Middle China  152,000   
South China  2,646,000   
Macao 152,000   
Philippines 90,000   
Japan 347,000   
South America  77,000   
USA 37,000   
A special line (with two ships) joined Indochina and Hong Kong in the first decade of 
the 20th century
60 and a special shipping line between Haiphong and Hong Kong was 
                                                 
57 Yazuo Gonjo, op.cit., p. 82. 
58 Paul Caron, “Le riz”, L’Illustration économique et financière, special issue L’Indochine, 1925, n°15, pp. 40-
41. 
59 Report on the rice market in Hong Kong, 25 May 1931. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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adjudicated in 1910 (to East Asiatic shipping). Hong Kong banks were used to finance loans 
to Saigon traders exporting rice to Hong Kong (and then often to Japan), and BIC joined in 
this business HSBC and Bank of China; but it progressively enlarged its market share. Chinese 
merchants of rice in Saigon-Cholon gathered packs of documentary credits on Hong Kong, 
and the payments by Hong Kong importers fueled cash, to be used there.  
Meanwhile, coal trade opened doors to important credits: Charbonnages du Tonkin, a 
colliery which sold coal in Hong Kong, became a client of the BIC branch from the start
61; 
Hong Kong houses were financed by BIC to trade Tonkin coal (for instance bills issued by 
Butterfiled & Swire on Charbonnages de Hongay
62); a $600,000 payment was completed in 
favour of Société française des charbonnages in 1896, as advances on sales to Hong Kong 
traders
63. But the large dimension of such trade explains that companies had often rather use 
HBSC as their banker on Hong Kong instead of BIC, complaining against such attitude
64... 
Trade on goods was also financed by the BIC branch, all the more because some of 
BIC’s clients in Indochina itself intensified their operations with Hong Kong: Union 
commerciale indochinoise et africaine (UCIA) opened thus an office in Hong Kong in 1907 
for import-export wholesale trading. A comprehensive assessment of such flows seems 
impossible, but the Hong Kong branch showed its usefulness and efficience on several cases – 
for exemple when French Descours & Cabaud sent tyres to the Europe Asia Trading company 
in Indochina with discount by BIC Hong Kong
65. Trade house Optorg – diversifying from its 
ancient activities in Russia – moved to Hong Kong and Shanghai in 1923 and started there 
import trade of goods (mainly wool cloth, but also spirits and champagne, pharmaceutics) 
which it delivered against promissory notes
66, and BIC Hong Kong became its leverage in 
Asia; it collected its remittances on Hong Kong, fueled exchange contracts (FRF 982,000 in 
1931), and carried a large portfolio of bills drawn on Chinese clients ($82,000 on I.P. Hang 
Fong in 1931) for goods stored at the name of the bank pending sales
67. But generally 
speaking, imports from Hong Kong were inferior to exports from Indochina to Hong Kong, 
which explains the cash to be used as treasury deposits or short-term investments on the Hong 
Kong markets, or even to purchase bills of exchange to be remitted in London or Paris. 
                                                                                                                                                          
60 It was managed from 1907 by Compagnie française des Indes et de l’Extrême-Orient, created in 1903 by  the 
Combarieu family; 5 May 1907,  
61 Charbonnages du Tonkin was a Franco-British company, which had been founded by Paul Charter, at the end 
of the 19th century. 
62 Letter from the branch manager, 24 June 1895. 
63 Ibidem, 9 September 1896. 
64 Ibidem, 29 December 1925, about Charbonnages du Tonkin, which left its funds by HSBC because its suppliers 
had accounts in this bank. 
65 Ibidem, 26 March 1924. 
66 Ibidem, 20 November 1924. 
67 Ibidem, 23 February 1931. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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Table 4. Commercial partners
68 of Indochina in 1924 (frf million) 




Metropolitan France  712  346 
Hong Kong  247  743 
China 129  121 
Singapore 49  153 
Dutch Indies   62  74 
British Indies   62  ? 
Philippines ?  124 
B. Banque de l’Indochine Hong Kong at the service of French 
business in Guangzhou 
French business had taken shape meanwhile in Guangzhou (Canton) itself: French 
traders were active on this market, to import goods there and of course to export silk and 
various textiles; and they cooperated with Chinese houses either of Guangzhou or of Hong 
Kong
69. A French shipping line (Trévoux) was even opened (with four ships) between 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong (90 miles), and Guangzhou and Woutcheou (on a river upstream 
westward from Guangzhou) in 1901 thanks to grant from the Indochina government, despite 
the leadership of the Hong Kong Guangzhou Macao Steamship Company
70 because some 
kind of a French zone of influence spread East-West from Yunnan to Kuangsi and the limits 
of Kwantung (Guangdong) – but the French-controlled Kuang Tcheou Wan port never 
competed with Hong Kong. Business was reinforced when the Kowloon-Guangzhou railway 
was opened in April 1909 (inaugurated in October 1910), which led to a whole line Hong 
Kong-Guangzhou for 178 km. BIC could take profit from the growing relationship between 
Hong Kong and Guangzhou, either by riverboats or by train. This business was a magnificent 
opportunity – except when civil war occurred around Guangzhou in 1910-1913 (see further). 
French authorities favoured a forward policy of French traders (Pasquet, Boyer, Mazet, 
Varennes, Guillet, etc.) in south-western China – and BIC Hong Kong sustained them in 
complement to BIC Guangzhou, because brokers helped French traders investing their 
treasury on Hong Kong, or fueled acceptance credits for bills presented in Hong Kong
71 to be 
remitted in Saigon or elsewhere. Four-months documentary credits were developed in favour 
of French silk traders on Guangzhou, with “bills negotiated against shipment of silk (whether 
raw, waste or manufactured)”
72 from September 1908. 
After  WW1, trading in the Guangzhou area became risky and BIC had to assess the 
balance sheet of its clients, for instance when the most active house there, Gérin-Drevard, 
tackling cotton yarns, silk and rice (in Haiphong, Yunnanfou and Guangzhou), needed fresh 
                                                 
68 P. Morlat, op.cit., p. 3. 
69 See W.E. Cheong, The Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, Richmond, 
Surrey, Curzon, 1997. Ming Chan, “All in the family: The Hong Kong-Guangdong link in historical 
perspective”, in Reginald Kwok & Alvin So (eds.), The Hong Kong-Guangdong Link: Partnership in Flux, 
Armonk, Sharpe, 1995. 
70 Letter from the branch manager, 7 May 1904. 
71 Ibidem, 5 November 1907. 
72 Ibidem, 21 July 1908. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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loans, either from the Guangzhou branch or from the Hong Kong one
73 – bearing then 
exchange contracts for FRF 700,000 and a portfolio of bills of FRF 1,216,00 or £12,000 – 
before its collapse in 1926. The civil war in Kwangsi in 1922-1923 put brakes on business
74. 
But trade was resumed each time, and BIC Hong Kong took part to advances on goods 
(human hair, fantasy feather for fans, cow and buffalo hides, duck down for bedding, silk 
scraps
75, etc.) to export Franco-Chinese trading houses (Charles Meurer, Kranjia, in 1924; 
Albert Gresse
76 in 1929) using Hong Kong wholesale-traders relays. BIC Hong Kong 
contributed thus to the interweaving of French and Chinese firms on both Guangzhou and 
Hong Kong places. 
BIC also worked with import houses: Pinguet needed for example between $65,000 to 
200,000 to sell through Hong Kong to Guangzhou Chinese houses (through its own 
compradore) fabrics from French northern industralists, steel, cigarette paper, or Tonkin coal 
(and even armaments in 1927)
77. BIC financed the imports by “ancient and well-known” 
Chinese houses of growing imports of fabrics and moreover of steel exported by French 
company De Wendel
78, which reveals the modernisation of Guangdong economy. It even 
became in 1937 the representative in Hong Kong of French textile house Lepoutre, from 
Roubaix, as its agent for handling, storage,and sales
79 of yarns. BIC Hong Kong relied too on 
“our biggest client for imports, Franco-Chinese Trading”, with risks reaching $46,000 in 1925 
on pieces goods and sundries and $25,000 (or FRF 314,000) through discount of bills
80 emitted 
on the firm by suppliers in London, Bradford, and Manchester – guaranteed by a mortgage, a 
deposit of equity and a collateral on goods. This company had become a client in January 
1922: “It was one of our best clients, and our branch had often borne with it important risks, 
notably because of credits to import and exchange contracts. In 1925 particularly the opened 
credits in Europe and Australia exceeded $400,000. All these businesses were completed 
satisfactorily and fueled, all along years, good profits. The manager of the company, H.A.P. 
Low, and his elder brother, W.A.H. Low [himself established in Guangzhou], are young 
Chinese coming from Australia where they received a modern education [...]. Their export 
trade with the Floquet house in Paris has always been much satisfying.”
81 
The mission attributed by French State to BIC in the mid-1890s to serve as a leverage to 
French businessmen in Asia was assumed on its part with talent and efficiency by its Hong 
Kong branch. It sustained the offensive of French merchants in south-western China, from 
Yunnan to Guangdong, which took part to the general Chinese growth
82, and mainly on the 
Guangzhou market itself, where were active so many Franco-Chinese joint-ventures, and 
where so many French goods were imported. A somewhat “local” market was thus 
entertained by BIC Hong Kong through flows of remittances from Guangzhou to Hong Kong 
and vice-versa. We cannot estimate the actual contribution to French commercial 
                                                 
73 Ibidem, 9 September 1920. 
74 A bomb attack struck a dinner in honour to French general governor Merlin visiting Canton: he escaped it but 
the manager of Banque de l’Indochine branch was serioulsy wounded and its cashier killed (20 June 1924). 
75 Letter from the branch manager, 26 March 1924. 
76 Ibidem, 3 May 1929, with a credit of $23,250. 
77 Ibidem, 22 September 1929. 
78 Ibidem, 22 August 1930. 
79 Ibidem, 7 July 1937. 
80 Ibidem, 5 October 1925. 
81 Ibidem, 17 January 1927. 
82 See Thomas Rawski, Economic Growth in  Prewar China, Berkeley, 1989. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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development in this area, for lack of figures, but it helped transforming the breakthrough into 
solid and durable commercial positions. 
4. The development of activities on the Hong Kong market 
Les résultats que nous obtenons peuvent être déclinés en trois points. D’abord, les 
régressions menées ne permettent pas d’infirmer l’hypothèse de la CEKU  : l’ajustement 
quadratique des nuages de points pour la plupart des polluants donne une courbe en forme de 
cloche, avec une qualité d’ajustement généralement assez bonne. Nous testons ensuite un 
certain nombre de facteurs explicatifs de cette CEKU, qui tiennent à l’individu (choix modal) 
et à son environnement (niveau de service et offre d’infrastructures). Enfin, nous discutons de 
la validité des résultats obtenus. 
It was no longer a mere representative tool for the BIC network of the French banking 
community, and it became authorised and able to provide credit services to non-French 
customers. First, the temptation was so strong because of the upsurge of commercial 
opportunities on the Hong Kong market, stimulated by the development of its maritime transit 
– 527,280 ship coming in and out with a 38,8 million tons traffic in 1909, told the branch. 
Second, a classical trend was the increasing embeddeness
83 of the branch among the banking 
community and more largely the Hong Kong business: the reputation of its competence and 
creditworthiness, its Banque de l’Indochine brand (now recognised all over South-East Asia 
and China), its role as a platform for bills and currencies exchange, and the art of its director 
to be introduced into some social events led to an implicit admission of the deep-rootedness 
of the branch within the Hong Kong banking and business community.  BIC Hong Kong 
activated altogether its strategic action and the social construction of its economic perception 
on the Hong Kong market. 
From the start it had been recognised by the leaders, because it did not confront them: it 
acted under their tutelage, for instance as it opened accounts for cash flows are at HSBC
84 and 
Chartered Bank from the mid-1890s. It had to admit to the market conditions fixed by these 
leaders: “HBSC, mastering the rates in Hong Kong, and Shanghai, manoeuvres them alongside 
its own needs and can set profitable operations with minimal risks, the initiative of which 
cannot be taken by a competitor because, depending on the rates fixed by the local bank, it 
would be exposed to serious setbacks.”
85 The attitude of co-operation and the policy of 
finding out complementary niches prevailed over challenging such British domination, which 
confirmed the position reached in other Chinese areas
86. 
The portfolio of competence of the BIC branch could thus bear fruit at the service of a 
non-French customership and take profit of networking among Chinese communities
87 either 
in Hong Kong or in neighbouring harbors (Guangzhou, or else). Any development had to 
                                                 
83 See Mark Granovetter, “Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness”, American 
Journal of Sociology, 91 (3), November 1985, pp. 418-510. M. Granovetter & Richard Swedberg, The Sociology 
of Economic Life, Boulder, Westview Press, 2001 (2nd edition). 
84 Frank King, The History of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Volume 1. The Hong Kong 
Bank in Late Imperial China, 1864-1902: On an Even Kneel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
85 Letter from the branch manager, 19 March 1907. 
86 E.W. Edwards, « The origins of British financial co-operation with France in China, 1906-1961 », English 
Historical Review, 1971, LXXXVI, pp. 285-317.  
87 See Sherman Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks: Western, Japanese and Chinese Corporations in 
China, 1880-1937, Berkeley, 2000. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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adopt this strategy anyway because French trading there was relatively a meager one, with 
only a share of 3,3 per cent of the total amount of Hong Kong trade with the nine leading 
foreign countries shipping with the harbour
88 and a mere 1,17 per cent of the whole 22,4 
million tons of the global Hong Kong trade with foreign countries (in and out transit) (against 
17,2 per cent for the UK). 
Table 5. Hong Kong harbour trade (steamers and sailing) in tonnage in 1909 
Total of the nine leading shipping countries  7,796,376 








Austria-Hungaria   94,288 
France itself (with less than 0,5 per cent of import-export) occupied only a secundary 
place as an actor on the Hong Kong market, and only through Indochina did it play a 
significant role there, reaching on tenth of imports (because of rice) and almost 5 per cent of 
exports (towards Gouangdong, mainly), far less than Belgium (because of fabrics and 
mechanics, sold to central China?). France leading deliveries to Hong Kong were then 
chemical and drugs, dyeing and tanning materials, and foodstuffs. 
Table 6. Hong Kong trade with a few countries89 in March 1933 (hk$) 
 Imports  Exports 
Total   49,252,000  50,099,000 
France  248,000 (0,5%)  174,000 (0,347%) 
Indochina   4,679,000 (9,5%)  2,247,000 (4,49%) 
Belgium 6,476,000  9,786,000 
Germany   1,837,000  92,000 
Usa 4,788,000  1,880,000 
Japan 2,045,000  1,217,000 
Siam 4,877,000  1,484,000 
Indonesia   3,994,000  758,000 
North China  6,476,000  9,786,000 
Middle China  824,000  3,765,000 
South China  5,739,000  1,440,000 
B. Collecting deposits 
The BIC branch gained in creditworthiness and ended collecting deposits from trading 
houses and banks – either from branches all over South-East Asia or from BIC branches – 
which led to thick disponibilities: they were for example estimated at $645,000 in 1907 (of 
                                                 
88 We refer to an article of the Hong Kong Daily Press, 3 June 1910 – but we are not sure of the accuracy of 
these figures. 
89 Figures supplied by Banque de l’Indochine Hong Kong, 1933. French banks in Hong Kong (1860s-1950s): Challengers to British banks? 
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which 640,000 in bank-notes)
90. The amount of stable deposits grew to $3 million
91 in 1912. 
From the start, the branch inherited from CNEP rich mandarins who had been depositors since 
a decade. But it desperately lacked of important and stable deposits, which “hindered it from 
fostering operations which it could find out”
92. It got deposits from merchant houses, 
especially those to which it granted credits. 
C. Credits to trading 
The emergence of a lending policy to Hong Kong business took shape slowly but 
steadily, but with a lucid conscience of the actual balance of power: “We are here in 
competition of the central administration of a powerful institution [HSBC],  the absolute 
master of the market.”
93 Such a pressure culminated during the 1910-1913 years (the 
Guangzhou struggle), when the glut of unused capital on the Hong Kong market eroded the 
interest rates, which weighted on the profitability. BIC had thus to face the conditions imposed 
by HSBC. This situation enticed it to select attentively the borrowers because the profit margin 
was screwed by the leading bank, all the more for years it lacked resources in deposits as 
leverage to finance a sharp extension of loans. The raise of its current capital in 1900 changed 
its way of life because advances could reach a $1,2 million ceiling
94, and the range of loans 
was at the same time extended to loans in blank.  
But its skills were based on a long experience: from the start, it had opened loans on 
collateral to big Chinese merchants (for opium and cotton trade)
95. Such loans became the 
priority, on fabrics and spun yarns, on raw materials (mercury, opium, saltpetre) or even silver 
and gold leaves): “Such advances can be opened either to European traders, or Indian or 
Chinese ones”
96, with a 4,5 to 6 per cent return. Advances on equity were also developed (for 
example, for an amount of $432,000 in 1907 against a pledge value of 788,000 and a profit 
margin of 20 per cent
97). In practical terms, for truly Chinese activities besides French 
business, BIC Hong Kong was involved to credits to trading of tin from south-west China 
(West of Mongze, in Yunnan, just north to Indochina border): four-fifths of tin extracted there 
were exported to Hong Kong because the Ko Tirou mines owners sold their production to 
about 15 to 20 Guangzhou and Hong Kong Chinese traders
98; this tin was joined in Hong 
Kong by cargo coming from Singapore and Penang; then tin was exported either to China 
(1/5) or to Europe by European houses. And BIC tried to take part to the chain of credit, which 
was still more developed in the 1920s because the branch lent on inventories of tin to 
companies exporting to the USA or Japan, and for some little to Indochina
99.  
BIC Hong Kong became involved in some credit activities to Chinese merchants having 
business in Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and in areas upstream of Guangzhou, alongside the West 
River up to Wushou-Wou Tcheou and up to Nanning (in Kwangsi) with small steamers then 
from Wushou to Nanning on river-boats. But BIC Hong Kong enriched its customership by 
                                                 
90 Letter from the branch manager, 19 March 1907. 
91 Ibidem, 6 March 1912. 
92 Ibidem, 11 March 1897. 
93 Ibidem, 29 April 1911. 
94 Ibidem, 3 February 1900. 
95 Ibidem, 28 March 1895. 
96 Ibidem, 11 March 1897. 
97 Ibidem, 19 March 1907. 
98 Ibidem, 7 March 1905. 
99 Ibidem, 28 February 1925. The branch received bills emitted by Chinese merchants in Mongtseu (Mongze) on 
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seducing renowned houses, for instance David Sassoon Sons & Co
100. Several houses (Jardine 
& Matheson, Chater & Mody, SJ David, AG Morris, TH Whitehead
101) were little 
shareholders of BIC, which confirms that they were its clients, for example for imports in 
Hong Kong of opium and cotton yarn. Its portfolio of advances on call grew strongly in the 
1920s (with rates at 6,5 per cent
102 in 1924) – thanks to cash deposited by the Saigon branch. 
Advances on equity were developed in parallel and reached for instance $4,058 million in 
June 1925 and 3,782 million in October, “among which 1,125 million to Chinese clients with 
the guarantee of our compradore through an equity value of 1,647 million”, and all these 
clients were considered as “serious and solvent”
 103. The branch financed more and more 
advances on goods to local companies (Ruttojee  & Sons, for exemple, in 1930, with credits 
of $68,406, notably for brandy) or Hong Kong Brewers & Distillers
104. “The risks on Hong 
Kong are normal risks and are mainly constituted with advances well pledged by mortages, 
by equity or by exchange contracts, the delivery of which functions regularly.”
105 
Globally BIC Hong Kong became a hub for cash transfers mixing operations for the 
inner flows of BIC branches in South-East Asia (from Indochina to Hong Kong, then to 
London and Paris), or for the outer flows generated by merchants having constituted a “local” 
customership. And it became more and more another hub using cash avilabilities to finance 
flows from Hong Kong to London, sometimes through operations linking Hong Kong and 
India, then India to London – because of imports of opium and textiles from India against 
refined opium and silk. A global framework took shape with intercrossed and cleared flows of 
bills and silver piasters, within South-Asia, with relays in India, or directly to London and 
Paris. 
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D. The development of activities in the Pacific area 
For the relationship between BIC Hong Kong and the whole Asia, currency exchanges 
was also predominating, especially on yen – even its sister in Singapore assumed a larger 
activity in the 1890s. BIC Hong Kong concluded for example a durable contact with 
Nederlandsche HandelsMaatschappij, a trading house active in Singapore, for deposits in 
Hong Kong – balanced by deposits by BIC Hong Kong on NHM account in Singapore
107 – and 
the amount reached one million francs
108 in 1897. BIC nurtured relations with Japanese banks 
because of exports from Indochina to Japan and also because of its growing part on the Hong 
Kong market: it welcome for example deposits from Yokohama Specie Bank
109; through its 
branch in Nagasaki, this latter tackled bills emitted by BIC customers on their Japanese 
correspondants
110. With a fighting spirit, BIC Hong Kong gained deposits from Banco Espanol 
Filipino – an institution linked with the Catholic Church in Philippina – and became its 
correspondant in Hong Kong
111. Taiwanese banks oriented some funds in the favour of BIC 
(for instance Bank of Taiwan in 1912 for a deposit of $120,000). Through intensified contacts 
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it got access to a few local clients whose trading scope covered the whole Asia, for example 
(in 1912) the house AM Essabhoy, which provided remittances on Bombay, Shanghai, and 
Yokohama (for a $410,000 amount); or with Société d’oxygène et acétylène d’Extrême-
Orient, a subsidiary of French Air liquide and Japanese interests, to become its banker in 
Hong Kong
112. 
E. Credits to real estate and mortgage 
When  Crédit foncier d’Extrême-Orient, a Belgian company spreading its mortgage 
activities in China, decided to extend its scope from Shanghai to Hong Kong, the BIC branch 
became its godfather on the Hong Kong market
113 and its re-financing bank; it accompanied 
its growth by providing it loans – for example an amount of $387,000 in 1912. This support 
was confirmed in the interwar, with the guarantee of Crédit foncier d’Indochine
114 when real 
estate operations gathered momentum with pushing initiatives; and from April 1926 the 
director of BIC Hong Kong ended managing also this company, which was removed in the 
same building than the branch
115. A very few other clients obtained loans for real estate 
operations, notably the Hong Kong Development Building & Savings Society (for £312,000 
in 1928) or local Chinese investors presented by CFEO
116, Lam Chor Yin and Lam Chai Leung 
($557,000 in 1931). 
F. Banque de l’Indochine Hong Kong and finance 
In fact, the Hong Kong branch was not really involved in finance: large operations were 
conceived and led by HSBC
117; and when French interests were invited to the roundtable, the Paris BIC 
headquarters prevailed, sometimes with the support of the Beijing and Shanghai branches: that was the 
case for the purchase of the Hankeou-Guangzhou railway in 1905. But BIC took part to the 7 per cent 
silver loan issued by HSBC for the Guangzhou Province in 1911 (an amount of $1,666,667 of the total 
of 7 million), through cash availabilities in its Guangzhou (2/7) and Hong Kong (5/7) branches
118, and 
thus it became a financial partner of HBSC and Deutsch Asiatisch Bank in this operation; the service of 
this loan was suspended during the civil war troubles in 1912, then restarted and the sum was repaid
119 
in July 1913 owing to the huge Reorganisation Loan to which BIC took part, but after negotiations 
where its Paris managers were the key representants, without any influence of the Hong Kong branch, 
which even did not broker any note. But it benefitted from a final return of the 1911 loan of 15,6 per 
cent (with a profit of $144,000 for a capital invested of $1,064,000). 
BIC Hong Kong of course was not transformed into a genuine challenger of mighty 
British banks and HSBC: it was keen to recognize their domination and thus succeeded in 
collaborating with them for forex and treasury management. It only drilled a few niches, 
where it could get some profit from its availabilities: it became a “second-rank deputy-
banker” for some trading houses which included it within their Pacific, Indian or Asia-
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European networks of clearing; it worked with Asian affiliates of French companies; and it 
took part to the Hong Kong day to day money market for lending on call or collecting 
deposits – only as a complementary cog of the Hong Kong banking machinery. 
6. A first outlook on the outcome of Bic Hong Kong branch 
After having determined the efficiency and the capability of the Hong Kong branch, a 
global survey has to gauge its ability to be profitable and to get some place within the 
business model of BIC. 
A. The evolution from the 1890s to WW1 
One first success of the BIC branch in Hong Kong was indoubtedly the building of a 
portfolio of skills which helped it cross conjuncture and face competition with resilience. 
Thanks to its compradore’s team or to the forward policy of its manager, it practiced true 
banking through an array of advances to traders (on promissory notes, equity, goods, gold or 
silver) and its commitments doubled from 1909 to 1912: 
Table 8. The credit positions of the Bic Hong Kong branch
120 in 1909 and 1912 
  In March 1909  In June  1909  In September 1909  In March 1912 
Total amount  1,928,950  1,856,000  1,344,290  4,050,000 
(approximatively) 
Stable credits        3,122,000 
Other short term credits        928,000 
(approximatively) 
Advances on promissory 
notes 
322,000 244,000 384,000  526,000 
Advances on equity  814,000  728,000  490,290  785,000 
Advances on goods  100,000      250,000 
Advances to Chinese 
bankers 
50,000 370,000  245,000  77,000 
Advances on gold and silver  392,750  264,000  225,000   
Loan to Bank of Taiwan  250,000  250,000  250,000   
Part of the Guangdong loan        762,000 
Crédit foncier d’Extrême-
Orient 
    387,000 
Credit to a single trading 
house (AM Essabhoy) 
    410,000 
Loans to BIC branches in 
Bangkok, Singapore and 
Shanghai 
    727,000 
Its second success was its history itself because it crossed crashes and recesses without 
collapsing, although the Hong Kong market faced hard difficulties in some years. The very 
cause of its foundations had been the bleak state of this market, which led to the retirement of 
Comptoir national d’escompte de Paris: almost at the same time, Hong Kong was shaken by a 
harsh crisis, which led to the fall of the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and 
China
121 in 1893; in 1897, the branch suffered from high tensions on money markets
122 in the 
Far-East and a true monetary crisis in Shanghai and Hong Kong, with a stop put on import 
business; it required a few quarters to restart exchanges. Then it had to unfold its activities in 
1905-1906 because of an economic crisis which struck Hong Kong (during the Russia-Japan 
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war): business was at a standstill, inventories piled up in warehouses
123, exports had 
dwindled, commerce between Shanghai and Hong Kong was reduced, interbank currency 
exchanges was limited: “Chinese capitalists and traders refrain from any operation. They 
seem to wish to extend to all foreigners the boycott set up against Americans. The activities of 
our branch are deeply hit by such conditions.”
124 But thanks to its keen compradore, the 
branch “was the sole in Hong Kong to get unharmed out of the numerous failures which 
occurred”
125, even if the recession was prolonged by a financial and economic crisis in Japan 
itself
126 in 1906-1907. 
Then political history shook banking: the Guangzhou population started boycotting 
Japan and Japanese trade
127 and revolutionary troubles took place in south-western China, 
even in th French zone of influence in Yunnan
128; but uncertainty was crushed for a while and 
business took off again. All at sudden, BIC complained that “Hong Kong did never cross a so 
much intense crisis”
129: brakes were put on business, cash availabilities grew and interest rates 
fell, thus depriving the branch from profitable returns for treasury piled up in the name of 
Indochinese branches because of shortage of loans and investments. Nationalist moves 
followed to rekindle uncertainty, when antiJapanese demonstrations and riots in China and 
Hong Kong and their repression –even against Chinese merchants – concerned businessmen, 
with a little crisis of trust and withdrawals of deposits from the Chinese community. BIC had 
to manoeuver to avoid bad credits or to lose money, and such qualities were still required later 
on in 1910-1911 when the Guangzhou troubles provoked general unease on the Hong Kong 
market, with even “a monetary panics in Guangzhou”
130, the rejection of the Chinese 
currency. Guangzhou declared its independency, its vice-king flew to Hong Kong: “Business 
suffer a lot from the present state of things and are almost at a standstill”
131 and the 
repayment of the 1911 Kwantung loan was suspended for some terms in 1912 when the 
Republic was proclaimed in Guangzhou. After a revolt, the independance of Guangzhou, the 
escape of its vice-king to Hong Kong, and a row of panics among the Hong Kong community 
about the fate of its assets in Guangdong, general unease put brake on exchanges: “Business is 
suffering hard and are almost stopped.”
132 This stand-off culminated in 1913 when 
revolutionary troubles extended, then were crushed, with the flight of the Guangzhou 
governor on a French gunboat to Hong Kong
133. Because of such revolutionary troubles, 
“Hong Kong is calm but business are thoroughly stopped”
134 and “operations are managed 
with an extreme prudence”
135.  
This accumulation of events explain first that BIC Hong Kong did not try to challenge 
HSBC domination as it had to progress slowly to avoid bad business, involvement into risky 
credits to rash traders or into unwise forex operations. It was a good lesson of banking 
management, thus increasing the capital of knowledge and competence of this young branch. 
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B. The evolution from WW1 to 1937 
One clue is that BIC Hong Kong was not the core of the model business of BIC: its 
weight against global returns of the bank was meager – for example from 1,2 to 7,6 per cent 
in 1916-1920. South China activities as as whole supplied a larger chunk of returns (from 5,6 
to 11,2 per cent). But some revenues of other branches could not have been so high, had the 
Hong Kong branch not existed, because it injected fuel in the “banking machine” tackling 
flow of bills, funds, and forex all over southern Asia: Guangzhou, Saigon, and Haiphong 
benefitted from its action. Even if we might think that using HSBC or another British bank 
could have be equivalent, BIC Hong Kong first helped avoiding spreading information about 
the Asian activities of BIC to harsh competitors; second and conversely the branch could 
collect useful information about the Hong Kong market and moreover about trading houses 
active there, which could have consolidated the action of the other BIC branches. 
Table 9. Returns of the main Bic branch
136 at the turn of the 1920s (in percentage) 
  First term 1916  First term 1919  Second term 1919  First term 1920 
Saigon  32,3 36,2 24,5 27,2 
Haiphong 6  6,6  7,2  5,6 
Hanoi 3,6  6,2  8  6,8 
Pnom  Penh  1,8 1,9 2,7 1,8 
Tourane  0,9 0,6 1,3 0,2 
Indochina and Cambodge  44,6  50,9  47,3  41,6 
China  23,6 22,8 17,4 18,5 
South China (Guangzhou, 
Mongtze and Hong Kong) 
11  9,2 11,2 5,6 
Guangzhou 2,4  2,7  3  -5,8 
Mongtze  5,3 5,3 6,2 3,8 
Hong Kong  3,3  1,2  2  7,6 
Shanghai  7,8 10,5 4,1 11,3 
Hankeou   3,9  -2,2  -0,2  0 
Tien  Tsin  1,8 5,5 1,9 2,4 
Beijing -0,9  -0,2  0,4  -0,8 
Singapore  4,7  2,7 16,1 3,6 
Paris 14,2  6,2  4,7  4,4 
Anyway the interwar proved the efficiency of BIC Hong Kong: then its French 
competitor Banque industrielle de Chine was caught into the collapse of a big trading house 
in Saigon and Hong Kong in 1921 and its Hong Kong branch was victim of a run: “It is an 
industrial bank and although I will not say that is has backed some industrial concerns too 
far, it has, perhaps, backed them quiet far enough.”
137 BIC reported that BIDC had “a bad 
customrship in Hong Kong”
138. Even if BIC went on working with it (for an amount of risks
139 
on forex and well pledged advances on goods of $80,000 or $660,000 – of which $20,000 are 
still pending in 1923), it avoided committing too much money, which preserved it when BIDC 
Hong Kong failed on 2 July 1921, leaving some depositors out of their funds: “Beyond a 
group, of small depositors, on quotes as the largest creditors foreign missions for $2 million, 
and Italian Domenican missions, a few Chinese traders and bankers.”
140 Even BIDC collapsed 
because its crippled business all over Asia, the bad management of its Hong Kong branch 
proved that the capital of experience accumulated by BIC Hong Kong was an efficient reality. 
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The reopening of BIDC (on 16 April 1923) – bailed out in France in 1923 and taking in 1926 
the name of Banque franco-chinoise – did not worry BIC because its challenger could never 
recover from its original difficulties
141. Strong capital of experience and competence were 
indeed required afterwards because the political and military events shook several times the 
Hong Kong market. The civil war in Kwangsi in 1922-1923 – between Sun Yat Sen’s troops 
and those of governor Cheng Kwing Ming, supported by Great Britain – disturbed business 
from Guangzhou to Hong Kong: “Chinese capitalist will abstain as long as the threat will 
hang on affairs.”
142 Merchants from inner China reduced their purchases in Hong Kong where 
inventories piled up, which had effects on credit activities.  
After some lull, social moves in Shanghai, Guangzhou (with a general strike), and even 
Hong Kong (with a general strike starting on 25 June 1925) led to a paralysis of business in 
the summer 1925 and to a run on some Chinese banks: “Happily we did not had loans on call 
to Chinese bankers.”
143 “ The whole business are paralysed and quite 60 large ship are 
immobilized in the port. Other ones had to overpass Hong Kong and to discharge goods in 
Manilla. Ship arrived last week from Tonkin left with their cargo. Merchandises already in 
warehouses cannot go out, and Chinese firms do not pay their bills any more.”
144 The 
authorities had to supervise and organise the market: “The settlement of equity which ought to 
take place today has been delayed to 7 July, which caused that repayments for $350,000 on 
advances on equity on which I counted for my treasury will not come in before one month.”
145 
And British banks (HSBC and Bank of China) had to refinance Chinese banks through a $6 
million, pledges by buildings owned by them. By chance, its prudence allowed the BIC branch 
to conclude favourably its forex contracts on sterling and USD, and its cash reached 
$1,212,000.  
The crisis perdured for several months because strikers reinforced their action: “The 
shipping is still paralysed because the boycott of British goods goes on with determination in 
Hong Kong and Guangzhou and in all the ports of South China. All the French merchants of 
Shameen [Guangzhou] left to Shanghai where the silk market has been moved.”
146 The BIC 
branch in Shanghai took thus in charge the silk business at the expense of the Guangzhou and 
Hong Kong ones... “Reds” – Republicans hostile to Beijing authorities – won some victories 
in the 1925 fall and even, from December
147, tempted a blockade of Hong Kong for a few 
months; and the situation of bankers became dangerous: “For six months, grave difficulties 
imposed to Hong Kong trade led to huge losses, and even the immediate resuming of relations 
would not bring back altogether the prosperity of the colony. Stagnation will continue for 
long: one cannot in a single day recover from six months of losses. The principal evil of which 
the colony is suffering is the gap of money. Because of the closure of neighbouring ports, 
quite all the export trade has stopped and the Hong Kong port, a port for transit and 
reexpedition, is cruelly shaken. In front of the impossibility to bring advances back, to achieve 
remittances, in front of the dwindling value of pledges they have in hand, banks have cut their 
favours: they do not lend any more and they open credits only parcimoniously.”
148 The 1925 
and 1926 years were thus a dire period for merchants and bankers – beyond the fate of local 
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working classes and citizens. Business in Guangzhou and the Guangzhou-Hong Kong 
relationship were almost frozen: “In Guangzhou, not a single shipment has been achieved 
directly to Europe or America up to October [1926]. Only during the two last months of the 
year [1926], a slight resumption has bee registered, but the fall of silk prices causes huge 
losses to Chinese spinning mills of which many are in bad situation.”
149 In November 1926, 
ships resumed the traffic between Guangzhou and Hong Kong; the branch could breathe 
somehow: the first payments of bills occurred, as it received at last $24,000 from Franco-
Chinese Trading and $20,000 from Pinguet; the equity market was reopened, renewing the 
liquidity of its $3,736,000 portfolio of advances on equity
150. 
Amid such a crisis, BIC Hong Kong could not but be patient and mourn about unbusy 
quarters... It even suffered some loss when one of its big clients, Gerin-Drevard, active in 
Guangzhou, became insolvent on January 1926, and credits for FRF 1,022 million were then 
pending; its main client, also active in Guangzhou, Franco-Chinese Trading, faced a financial 
crisis in January 1927 and froze its $310,000 debt towards BIC
151. “You don’t ignore the very 
grave crisis which, since eighteen months, is rageing on our place: import trading notably 
has been much stricken, especially for goods coming from Britain. Our client was much 
endebted: on 31 December 1925, we had in portfolio bills drawn on them for a total amount 
of £27,952 and FRF 376,323. The situation, everyday worst, did increase their 
embarrassement: on one side indeed no new business was possible; on the other side the local 
market was thoroughly blocked and inventories were piled up by importers. Last, as the 
boycott of Hong Kong lasted without any hope of a near agreement, our clients tried then, like 
many other ones, in order to repay their debt to our bank and to get rid of goods which lost 
value every day, to sell them in Guangzhou and other ports. The result was an important loss, 
either because of the confiscations achieved by strikers or by arbitrary taxations, and because 
of the depreciation of the value of goods, which reached 40 per cent or more. Last, the 
exchanges crisis, which occurred in last September, caused new losses to Franco-Chinese, 
which had not fixed exchange values for its bills in sterling and had thus to repay them at 
increased amounts. At the end of December 1926, for pending bills for £18,790 and FRF 
128,208, we had received $95,355; and the deficit today is of about $120,000.”
 152 The branch 
and the Low brothers agreed on a five-years repayment of the debt through promissory notes 
and its accounts were thus cleaned. But such a failure reveals the intensity of the crisis 
endured by bankers in Hong Kong and Guangzhou because of social and political upsurges: 
working in Hong Kong was not then an easy task, conversely with the image of an ever-
prosperous emporium. 
This crisis had further negative effects on the BIC branch: First it had to declare a loss 
on forex
153 for about £42,000 because on errors on interbanking operations when it kept too 
longly an important portfolio of sterling just when that latter fell on the Shanghai and Hong 
Kong markets because of nationalist moves in Nankin. Second, when the Hong Kong clients 
suspended their payments, the compradore could not apply its pledge because it had drawn on 
its availabilities during the previous quarters in 1926 and the crisis persisted: against a pledge 
of $175,000 (property) he had to guarantee the debt ($1,052,302, guaranteed by $298,000 in 
equity and $1,320,000 in property) of an important Chinese capitalist, Lee Hy San, the 
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leaseholder of the Macao casino. All in all, the crisis put brake on the repayment flows and 
had the branch be stuck in bad credit. 
Business resumed its normal course in the mid-1927 and in 1928-1929, following the 
normalisation of Chinese affairs, and BIC Hong Kong could recover momentum. But the 
autumn general crisis of trust had effects on Chinese banks, because of withdrawals of foreign 
deposits; in consequence the branch had to draw on its treasury to refund Chinese deposits 
(for about $500,000 to “friendly bankers”) and it had only $872,000 in cash against $800,000 
deposits in December
154. Bankers met to talk about tensions: “The monetary and forex 
situation of our market is completely desorganised.”
155 Because of the fall of rates imports 
were thorougly stopped, silver values fell against gold and currencies, and capital started 
flying Hong Kong because of silver basis values. Prudence prevailed, reserves in cash were 
kept high, Paris line of credit was used slowly. But the reports for the 1930-1935 years foster 
a perception of “business as usual” and even of growth, which contrasts with the murky 
reports of the 1923-1927 events. The branch took profit from its capital of experience and 
selected business drastically, but it tackled then important trading and forex operations. One 
turning point might have been September-November 1935, with the fall of some Chinese 
banks (Bank of Guangzhou, etc.) which caused “intense nervousness in business”
156. The 
counterpart of the prudent attitude of BIC Hong Kong was its huge stock of cash (about FRF 
10,672,000 in June 1935) although it disposed of large lines of credit by BIC Paris (FRF 
16,900,000), London (£250,000), and New York (USD 9,000) (and had to pay them interests): 
its success was thus linked with immobility except about forex arbitrages. This led to question 
the usefulness of such a branch because it did not have use of its funds because of the general 
situation of the Hong Kong market. 
The evolution of BIC Hong Kong depended therefore intimately of the very Chinese 
history, its nationalistic moves, its civil war, etc. But, despite a few errors with some 
Guangzhou clients, who imposed important delays in the repayment of their debts, the branch 
crossed the tumultuous years without a crisis of trust or a run, without important unbalance of 
its business. The compradore was an efficient and reliable intermediary (except in 1927 when 
he too was swallowed by the insolvency of some clients); the manager was cautious enough 
to avoid speculations and overborrowing. This might prove that the portfolio of skills and the 
capital of competence and experience of the branch had matured since the 1890s and that it 
had succeeded in maintaining the French flag against British competition and thus kept active 
its function of sustaining French business in South-East Asia. 
7. From unfolding to rebirth (from the end of 1930s up to 
mid-1950s) 
But History caught up with BIC Hong Kong, which had to submit to the twists and turns 
of political and military events in South China and Asia. 
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A. The apex of the function of Asian banking hub 
First, Japanese bombing on Guangdong and the threat of invasion paralysed Hong Kong 
business
157, and the harbour was jammed with goods unloaded since the fall which could not 
be sent to North China. Then the successes of Japanese army led to a reshaping of the network 
in China, and BIC Hong Kong became in 1939 the keystone of this banking architecture: main 
tasks assumed by the Shanghai branch were transferred in 1939-1941 to the Hong Kong 
one
158. It had to survey the records of Chemin de fer de Nanning, of which BIC managed 
banking and financial (for the service of a loan) flows; it became the representative of French 
airline Air France in China when it opened in 1937 a Hanoi-Hong Kong line. “Our branch 
takes part now, more than before, to truly Chinese business”, and it became officially the 
representative of BIC in China
159 in April 1939, in charge with the management of the whole 
circulation of treasury all over (accessible) China, especially for financial payments due to 
equity and bonds bearers. Then it collected the banking business of the Guangzhou branch 
after Guangzhou merchants flew to Hong Kong in the summer 1939 (mainly for bills issued 
on French purchasers of silk). 
B. Hard times because of wars and revolution 
This apex was much short-lived because of Japanese offensive; and business was at a 
standstill during Japanese occupation, all the more because the assets of banks in dollars had 
to be exchanged against “military yens” to finance indirectly the war – which explains huge 
losses in 1945 because of the depreciation of the yen
160. The role of BIC Hong Kong was 
rubbed off when Japan imposed itself from January 1941 as the sole purchaser of Indochinese 
commodities, which short-circuited classical networks
161. Then in 1945 BIC Hong Kong was 
divided between resuming business as usual – for instance to be reinserted within economic 
activities of South China and even into goods flows provoked by civil war (but for the 
moment we lack archives records) – and drawing lessons from the progress of Communist 
power. Beyond its effects on the Shanghai system and the loss of assets
162, this one put an end 
to the “business model” of BIC in the South-China area: Hong Kong was no more the hub of 
commercial and banking flows for merchants active from Yunnan to Guangdong – where the 
Guangxu branch fell on the Communist side as soon as November 1949. But merchants 
succeeded in selling goods piled up in 1945 when war was resumed in China to the 
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Philippines and Malaysia, cash disponibilites were reconstituted and the machine of credit 
restarted, which favoured BIC Hong Kong.  
Up to 1949-1950, it preserved its relation with its Shanghai and Tien Tsin sister 
branches and reaped thick profits
163, for instance thanks to forex operations on USD. 
Paradoxically, anticommunist France (fighting in Indochina) had preserved its commercial 
relation with China even after the Communist success, through a special agreement (“special 
operations cleared between France and China”
164). And BIC’s position was strong because it 
was among the very few foreign banks which had not asked for the liquidation of its assets
165 
and had negotiated in direct with Maoist authorities
166 in February 1950, which led to a 
favourable attitude of Chinese authorities. Despite the unfolding of activities in China
167 
(because of nationalisations and the blockade of Chinese assets by the USA in December 
1950) and the closure of BIC branches in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Hankeou in January 1952, 
BIC kept ties with Chinese authorities, even if the balance of power had moved towards 
Beijing
168. This explains several basic commercial contracts to be financed, for exemple in 
favour of trading companies purchasing sesame seeds, hemp grains, or crude soya bean oil
169.  
C. Considerations on a strategical move 
Considerations were anyway argued among Paris BIC direction which raised doubts 
about the future of its Hong Kong branch: the previous strategy as a hub sustaining French 
interests from Indochina or throughout South-China commercial markets seemed to meet a 
stalemate because of the centralised type of economy which was progressively set up in 
Communist China. Could Hong Kong provide a branch with fresh opportunities of business? 
On the small level of BIC Hong Kong, arguments about strategy
170 had to anticipate future. As 
it is well known, the flow of immigrants from China brought also merchants and capital, 
which placed the Hong Kong market at the core of a new business model, enlarged to the 
whole Chinese diaspora throughout Asia, before exports to continental China was resumed 
through what became the “gate to Red China” (despite the United Nations embargo in 1951) 
and before Hong Kong asserted itself as a new hub for intra-Asian and international trade
171. 
But these perspectives opened doors to another story: the emergence of a new banking 
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business model in Asia for French institutions, which had nothing in common with the history 
of BIC Hong Kong from the 1890s to the 1950s. 
Conclusion 
From this historical survey, a first conclusion has to be drawn: French banks were not 
so much isolated and confined to neighbouring European markets places, and important parts 
of these firms disposed of an international purpose and scope and some departments fostered 
forward policies of development abroad
172. They challenged thus the hegemony of the City
173 
in some areas, and they projected a forward policy even in Asia. Anyway French banks 
(Comptoir d’escompte de Paris, then Comptoir national d’escompte de Paris; Banque russo-
chinoise; Banque industrielle de Chine; Banque de l’Indochine) had rather work on the 
Shanghai market because its growth was substantial and mainly it was the gate to the huge 
Yangze Kiang area or in Beijing to get access directly to opportunities of loans and bonds 
issuing. This explains that the Hong Kong market hade not been first conceived as a priority 
for French banking interests because it lacked such impressive commercial or financial 
outlooks. Such reluctance was increased by the leadership of British banks in Hong Kong and 
particularly the hegemony of HSBC; and we saw that, in the 1890s, the board of Banque de 
l’Indochine did not favour giving financial leeway to its Hong Kong branch, doubting of its 
profitabily and even of its viability. 
Anyway the Honk Kong banking market got larger attention from French interests, 
essentially because of the very promotion of French business in South-East Asia. First it was 
relevant that some French bank acted as a correspondant in Hong Kong instead of British 
ones to contribute to the collection of direct information and to the financial resiliency of the 
commercial chain linking Indochina, Hong Kong and some Asian markets for rice trade: there 
was an obvious complementarity between BIC activities in Indochina and its Hong Kong 
branch. Second, French merchants fostered more and more associations with Chinese partners 
in the area covering west-southern China, from Yunnan to Guangdong and eastwards to Hong 
Kong: BIC Hong Kong could thus find growing activities through these exchanges, either for 
export or for import; and it proved therefore its usefulness to the promotion of French 
interests in Asia, in the wake of the policy defended by Paris Foreign Affairs, although on a 
secondary position against Sino-British business and banking. Third, a whole circuit was built 
which linked both areas of business (the Indochina-Hong Kong one; the west-southern China 
one) and worldwide exchanges: from Saigon and Haiphong to Hong Kong and from Yunnan-
Guangdong-Hong Kong, huge amounts of remittances of bills and of exchanges on currencies 
(piasters, dollars, pounds) were carried – sometimes with a step in India – up to London 
(mainly) and Paris, and BIC took part to this chain of banking and of profits.  
This three activities, based on the conception of the branch as a bridgehead on the Hong 
Kong market, provided BIC Hong Kong with its legitimacy, because it could develop a three-
forked strategy alongside geographical areas. And, because of its prudent management (owing 
to the managers and expatriates, or to the team of the compradore), it proved that it could 
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(generally) avoid bad loans and build a portfolio of skills and a capital of experience, which 
reinforced its legitimacy: cash and currency transfers, forex, banking (with basic documentary 
credits and also with an array of advances: on promissory notes, on goods, on equity, etc.), 
management of deposits, became classical practices; despite the independant moves by 
Guangzhou and Shanghai branches, it could value is direct acess to information, its 
knowledge of the interbank market, and therefore its advantage edge in front of assymetry of 
information. Fourth, this long-term development succeeded in strengthening the capital of 
competence of BIC Hong Kong: it could therefore took advantage of this latter and pick up 
some niches on the Hong Kong market itself, generally in co-operation with British banks (for 
interbanking forex or money market activities), but also with direct contacts with a few big 
European trading houses, and more and more with Chinese and Indian ones. Sure this 
breakthough on the Hong Kong market kept a mere medium-sized dimension, because 
sensible managers avoided competing with British banks; but they seized some opportunities 
to get in touch with a few Japanese, Taiwanese and Chinese companies. And finally the 
outcome of such strategy was some kind of a little internationalised branch, working in west-
southern China and inserted within the network of the Hong Kong market all over Pacific 
Asia.   
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